Wingo v. Twitter by United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
  
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 








vs.  No. 2:14-cv-02643-SHM-dkv           
  






 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO TRANSFER VENUE 
 
 On August 20, 2014, Plaintiff Martrek D. Wingo (“Wingo”), a 
resident of Memphis, Tennessee, filed a 38-page pro se complaint 
against the social media website Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) for 
physical injuries and emotional distress he allegedly suffered 
due to Twitter’s inadequacy in blocking unwanted and disturbing 
content.  (Compl., ECF No. 1.)   Before the court is the 
September 26, 2014 motion of Twitter to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, to transfer venue 
under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) pursuant to a forum selection clause.   
(ECF No. 11.)   Wingo did not file a response in opposition to 
Twitter’s motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to transfer 
venue, but notified opposing counsel that he did not plan on 
filing any opposition to the motion.  (See ECF No. 13.)   This 
case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for 
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management and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or 
report and recommendation as appropriate.   (Admin. Order 2013-
05, Apr. 29, 2013.)   For the reasons that follow, it is 
recommended that this case be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 
1404(a). 
I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
 In his complaint entitled, “My Personal Complaint Against 
Twitter,” Wingo alleges that, while using the Twitter site,  
“a person linked themselves to [Wingo’s] page through a retweet 
feature and [] their page shows someone who appears to have a 
fantasy or reality semi hidden murder suicide plot to harm a 
celebrity singer.”  (Compl. 2, ECF No. 1.)   Wingo alleges that 
this event “caused [him] so much shock that [he] passed out 
hitting the side of [his] mouth, and broke off [his] back left 
wisdom tooth that was swallowed.”   (Id.)   Wingo is suing 
Twitter for this personal injury and the “emotional distress and 
mental anguish before, during, and after [his] personal injury” 
in the amount of $20 million, along with “[c]ompensatory and 
[p]unitive damages to be determined by [j]ury.”   (Id.; Pl.’s 
Supporting Docs. 1, ECF No. 1-1.)    
II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A.  Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
 According to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, “[t]he district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter 
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in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different 
States.”  A federal court has jurisdiction under § 1332 only if 
there is “complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all 
defendants.”  Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 
(2005)(citations omitted).  “To establish diversity 
jurisdiction, one must plead the citizenship of the corporate 
and individual parties.”  Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 
F.2d 779, 792 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Johnson v. New 
York, 315 F. App’x 394, 395 (3d Cir. 2009); Sanders v. Clemco 
Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987)(complaint did not 
properly allege diversity jurisdiction); Leys v. Lowe’s Home 
Ctrs., Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 908, 912-13 (W.D. Mich. 
2009)(complaint and notice of removal did not adequately 
establish diversity jurisdiction); Ellis v. Kaye-Kibbey, No. 
1:07-cv-910, 2008 WL 2696891, at *2-3 (W.D. Mich. July 1, 
2008)(dismissing complaint for failure adequately to allege 
facts establishing diversity of citizenship despite conclusory 
allegation that diversity exists).  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(c)(1), “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of 
any state by which it has been incorporated and of the state 
where it has its principal place of business.”   
 Although Wingo does not assert that the court has diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, he has plead sufficient 
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facts to establish the citizenship of both parties and the 
amount in controversy.   (Compl., ECF No. 1.)   Wingo stated in 
his complaint that his address is 4194 Evening Star Cove, 
Memphis, Tennessee 38125.  (Id.)   “State citizenship for the 
purpose of the diversity requirement is equated with domicile.”  
Farmer v. Fisher, 386 F. App'x 554, 557 (6th Cir. 
2010)(quotation omitted).  Therefore, Wingo is a citizen of 
Tennessee.   
 Further, Wingo stated that Twitter’s address is 1355 Market 
Street, San Francisco, California 94103.  (Compl. 1, ECF No. 1.)   
Additionally, according to the Tennessee Secretary of State, 
Twitter is not incorporated in Tennessee.  Lastly, the amount in 
controversy threshold is satisfied in this case because Wingo is 
seeking $20 million in damages.  (Pl.’s Supporting Docs. 1, ECF 
No. 1-1.)   Accordingly, the court has diversity jurisdiction 
over this action.   
B. Transfer of Venue Under 1404(a) 
 Twitter seeks a transfer of venue to the Northern District 
of California pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) based on a forum-
selection clause in Twitter’s Terms of Service, which states the 
following:   
These Terms and any action related thereto will be 
governed by the laws of the State of California 
without regard to or application of its conflict of 
law provisions of your state or country of residence.  
All claims, legal proceedings or litigation arising in 
Case4:14-cv-05625-KAW   Document14   Filed11/25/14   Page4 of 7
5 
 
connection with the Services will be brought solely in 
the federal or state courts located in San Francisco, 
California, United States and you consent to the 
jurisdiction of and venue of such courts and waive any 
objection as to inconvenient forum. 
 
(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss or Transfer 10, ECF No. 11-1.)1   In his 
complaint, Wingo alleges that he is a Twitter user, and as such 
he agreed to Twitter’s Terms of Service when he initially 
registered to use Twitter and each time he accessed the service 
after registration.  (Id. at 9.) 
Section 1404(a) permits a court, in its discretion, to 
“transfer any civil action to any other district or division 
where it might have been brought or to any district or division 
to which all parties have consented.”  A forum-selection clause 
is “‘prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement 
is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under the 
circumstances.’”  Moses v. Bus. Card Express, Inc., 929 F.2d 
1131, 1136 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972)); Clayton v. Heartland Res. Inc., No. 
3:08-cv-0513, 2008 WL 2697430, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. June 30, 2008).   
                                                          
1The court may consider Twitter’s Terms of Service because 
Wingo has referred to them in his complaint, (Pl.’s Supporting 
Docs. 3-4, ECF No. 1-1), they are central to this motion, and 
they are a public record.  See Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d 
493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)(“‘[D]ocuments that a defendant attaches 
to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if 
they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are 
central to her claim.’” (quoting Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 
86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997))).  Twitter’s Terms of Service are 
publicly available at https://twitter.com/tos.   
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More recently, the Supreme Court has held that while 
ordinarily a district court considering a § 1404(a) motion must 
evaluate the “convenience of parties and witnesses” and “the 
interest of justice,” a forum-selection clause changes this 
analysis.  Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. 
Dist. of Tex., 134 S. Ct. 568, 581 (2013).  A forum-selection 
clause “represents the parties’ agreement as to the most proper 
forum,” and as such it should be given “controlling weight in 
all but the most exceptional cases.”  Id. at 581 (quotations 
omitted).  The party defying the forum-selection clause “bears 
the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for which 
the parties bargained is unwarranted.”  Id.  By consenting to a 
forum-selection clause, the plaintiff has waived the privilege 
to bring suit in the forum of his choice as well as the right to 
challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient.  Id. at 581-82.  
“As a consequence, a district court may consider arguments about 
public-interest factors only.”2  Id. at 582. 
 In the instant case, the parties have agreed that any legal 
proceedings will be brought solely in federal or state courts 
located in San Francisco County, California.  (See Def.’s Mot. 
                                                          
2
Public-interest factors include “the administrative 
difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest 
in having localized controversies decided at home; [and] the 
interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that 
is at home with the law.”  Atl. Marine Const. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 
581 n.6 (quotation omitted). 
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to Dismiss or Transfer 10, ECF No. 11-1.)   By agreeing to the 
forum-selection clause, Wingo “waive[d] the right to challenge 
the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for 
[him] or [his] witnesses, or for [his] pursuit of the 
litigation.”  Atl. Marine Const., 134 S. Ct. at 582.  Further, 
Wingo has not filed a response to Twitter’s motion to transfer 
venue, therefore, he has not challenged the forum-selection 
clause in this case.  Thus, Wingo has failed to show any public-
interest factors that would preclude the court from transferring 
the case to the forum to which the parties agreed.  Id. at 582.  
Accordingly, the court recommends that the forum-selection 
clause be enforced and the case be transferred to the Northern 
District of California. 
III. RECOMMENDATION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the case 
be transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of November, 2014. 
 
  
s/ Diane K. Vescovo__________  
            Diane K. Vescovo 




Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this 
report and recommended disposition, a party may serve and file 
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.  
A party may respond to another party=s objections within fourteen 
(14) days after being served with a copy.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
72(b)(2).  Failure to file objections within fourteen (14) days 
may constitute a waiver of objections, exceptions, and further 
appeal. 
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